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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
This case proceeded to a Jury Trial on April 3, 2013; at which time Ms. Hopkins was
convicted of Malicious Injury to Property a violation of Idaho Code § 18-7001. Ms. Hopkins
filed her Notice of Appeal on June 13, 2013. The District Court heard argument and took the
matter under advisement.

The District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order

affirming the conviction on January 14, 2014, and Ms. Hopkins now timely appeals. On appeal,
Ms. Hopkins asserts (1) that the trial court committed error when it failed to properly instruct the
jury on the defense of misfortune or accident; and (2) that there was insufficient evidence to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Hopkins had the requisite intent to maliciously injure
or destroy the property of another.
Statement of the Facts
Kelsey Hopkins is a recently married 21 year-old who lives in Garden City. (4/3/13 Tr.
142, Ls.11-12).

Kelsey has a very strong relationship with her brother because they were

abandoned by their mother at a very young age and their father died of cancer during their
formative years. (4/3/13 Tr. 142, Ls.15 - p. 143 Ls.16). They were basically homeless and
Kelsey was responsible for her brother. (4/3/13 Tr. 143, Ls.15-19).
On the date in question, Kelsey was at her brother's court hearing for a juvenile issue.
(4/3/13 Tr. 143, L.25). After the sentence, her brother was taken into custody and she quickly
and angrily left the courtroom. (4/3/13 Tr. 144, Ls.8-16). Kelsey was trying to hurry and leave
the courtroom and get to the car because she was about to cry and she does not like to cry in
front of other people.

(4/3/13 Tr. 144, Ls.8-16).

Kelsey cares a lot about her brother and

anything that happens to him hurts her deeply. (4/3/13 Tr. 145, Ls.13-16).
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After Kelsey opened the door, a loud knocking sound occurred and a hole in the wall was
discovered. (4/3/13 Tr. 98, Ls.11-24). An officer went to see Kelsey later in the day and at that
time Kelsey was unaware that there even was a hole in the wall where the door had hit it.
(4/3/13 Tr. 147, Ls.1-11). Kelsey did not see the hole nor hear the door hit the wall causing the
hole. (4/3/13 Tr. 148, Ls.2-6). She was very upset and was almost running to just try and get to
her car. (4/3/13 Tr. 148, Ls.7-10). Once Kelsey was made aware of the damage she apologized
and told the officer that she would return to the Courthouse on Monday to talk to them about
what she could do. (4/3/13 Tr. 148, Ls.14-18). Kelsey even offered to write a letter to the judge.
(4/3/13 Tr. 148, Ls.14-18). Kelsey specifically told the officer that she did not intend to put a
hole in the wall. (4/3/13 Tr. 148, Ls.14-18).
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ISSUES

I.

Did the trial court err when it failed to instruct the jury on the defense of misfortune
or accident?

II.

Was there sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Hopkins
had the requisite intent to maliciously injure or destroy the property of another?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Erred When It Failed To Instruct The Jury On The Defense Of Misfortune Or
Accident.
A.

Introduction
Ms. Hopkins asserts that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the defense

of misfortune or accident thereby depriving her of her constitutional rights to due process, in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article
I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution and therefore the conviction must be vacated.
B.

Standard of Review
The propriety of jury instructions is a question of law over which Idaho appellate courts

exercise free review. State v. Tadlock, 136 Idaho 413,414, 34 P.3d 1096, 1097 (Ct. App. 2001).
When reviewing jury instructions, the court must first ask whether the instructions as a whole,
and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect the applicable law. Id. To be reversible error,
instructions must have misled the jury or prejudiced the complaining party. State v. Young, 138
Idaho 370 (2002).
C.

The Trial Court Erred When It Failed To Instruct The Jury On The Defense Of
Misfortune Or Accident.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that, "[n]o person shall be

... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV. The Fifth Amendment's right to due process of law-includes the requirement that the State
bear the burden of proving all elements of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-78 (1993). Similarly, the Idaho Constitution guarantees

that, "[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
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ID. CONST. art. I, § 13. The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States Supreme
Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States Constitution to art.
1, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, Dep 't of Health and Welfare ex rel.

Caballero, 132 Idaho 221,227, 970 P.2d 14 (1998). Thus, the due process requirement that the
State bear the burden of proving all elements of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt is
also a requirement of Article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution.
The right to present a defense is a fundamental right of due process of law which includes
the defendant's right to present its version of the facts. State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236,220,239
P.3d 1055, 1058 (2009). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "[a]s a rule, the trial court is
required to give pertinent instructions by which the jury may be correctly informed with respect
to the nature and elements of the crime charged and any essential legal principles available to the
evidence admitted." State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 20, 981 P.2d 738, 745 (1999) (citations
omitted).
Idaho has codified the defense of misfortune or accident but, until recently, Idaho
appellate courts have not been presented with the opportunity to interpret the statute. See State v.

Macias, 142 Idaho 509, 129 P.3d 1258 (Ct.App.2005) (determining misfortune or accident
defense jury instruction proper but not required in a battery prosecution where the jury was
already instructed on the requisite state of mind element). Idaho Code Section 18-201 states that
"[ a]11 persons are capable of committing crimes except ... [p ]ersons who committed the act or
made the omission charged, through misfortune or by accident, when it appears thaHhere was
not evil design, intention or culpable negligence." The Idaho appellate courts have looked to
other courts for guidance in interpreting and applying the misfortune or accident defense. The
California Court of Appeals has provided the following analysis in regard to this defense:
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Black's Law Dictionary has defined misfortune as "[a)n adverse event, calamity,
or evil fortune, arising by accident (or without the will or concurrence of him who
suffers from it), and not to be foreseen or guarded against by care or prudence."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 6TH ED. The eighth edition of Black's Law
Dictionary has omitted the term "misfortune" altogether. Further, a search of case
law reveals that the defense is rarely referred to as one of misfortune and may
now simply be the defense of accident. An "accident," as defined by Black's Law
Dictionary, is either " [a]n unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence;
something that does not occur in the usual course of events or that could not be
reasonably anticipated," or "[a]n unforeseen and injurious occurrence not
attributable to mistake, negligence, neglect, or misconduct."
Black's Law Dictionary 8th Edition.
When a defense is one that negates proof of an element of the charged offense, the
defendant need only raise a reasonable doubt of the existence of that fact. This is so because the
defense goes directly to guilt or innocence. The trial court is required to instruct the jury on
which party has the burden of proof and on the nature of that burden. The accident defense is a
claim that the defendant acted without forming the mental state necessary to commit the crime.
People v. Gonzales, 74 Cal.App.4th 382, 390, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 111 (Cal.App.1999) (citations
omitted).
Where a special defense of accident or misfortune is provided the burden of production
for the defense is commonly on the defendant. The burden of persuasion is nearly always on the
state, beyond a reasonable doubt.

PAUL H. ROBINSON, ET. AL., CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES, 1 CRIM. L.
DEF .. § 63 (2005-06). The defendant may present evidence to create a reasonable
doubt in the minds of jurors as to whether the defendant acted with criminal
intent. WhetheI"-a-defendant may present- evidence of misfortune-and_whether the
defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on this defense depends on whether the
defendant proffers evidence of an accident that would relieve him of criminal
liability under the defined offense. In our case, the evidence proffered by Dolsby
must therefore support a theory of accident or misfortune that would relieve him
from liability for possession of a firearm for lack of the requisite mental state.
State v. Dolsby, 143 Idaho 352, 145 P.3d 917 (Ct.App. 2005)
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The mental state that is required for the commission of a particular offense is determined
by the language of the statute defining that offense. State v. Broadhead, l 3 9 Idaho 663, 666, 84

P.3d 599, 602 (Ct.App.2004). Whether criminal intent is a necessary element of a statutory
offense is a matter of construction, to be determined from the language of the statute in view of
its manifest purpose and design. State v. Prather, 135 Idaho 770, 774, 25 P.3d 83, 87 (2001).
The language of Idaho Code § 18-7001 states in relevant part that "except as otherwise
provided in subsection (2) of this section, every person who maliciously injures or destroys any
real or personal property not his own, .. . is guilty of a misdemeanor." [emphasis added] The
specific type of intent the state is required to prove is maliciously. Malicious injury to property
is not a general intent crime it is a specific intent crime and the malicious intent is defined as "the
desire to annoy or injure another or the intent to do a wrongful act." IC.TI 1302.
A trial court must inform the jury on "all matters of law necessary for their information."
LC. § 19-2132(a). A requested instruction must be given if: (1) it properly states the governing
law; (2) a reasonable view of at least some evidence would support the defendant's legal theory;
(3) the subject of the requested instruction is not addressed adequately by other jury instructions;
and (4) the requested instruction does not constitute an impermissible comment as to the
evidence.

Finally, the defendant in a criminal action is entitled to have his legal theory of

defense submitted to the jury through an instruction if there is a reasonable view of the evidence
that would support the theory. Tadlock 136 Idaho at 414.

·-TheCourt,·in-its denial ofthe-retJ_uestforthemisfortuneoraccidentinstructienstated as
follows:
"Okay. I will tell you that I am not inclined at this point to give that instruction
simply because I don't believe evidence up until this point supports that
instruction. That may change. I haven't heard all of the evidence at this point."
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(4/3/13 Tr. p.140, Ls.15-20)
"All right. With regards to that issue, I am going to sustain the State's objection."
(4/3/13 Tr., p.153, Ls.1-3).
The only instruction given with regard to intent m this case was m the element
instruction; Instruction No. 13 which provides the following:
" ... the word "maliciously" means the desire to annoy or injure another or the intent to do
a wrongful act."
(R., 45).

In State v. Macias, 142 Idaho 509, 129 P.3d 1258 (Ct.App.2005) the Court looked at the
jury instructions as a whole, and determined that it was not reversible error for the trial court not
to give an instruction on misfortune or accident. Id. However, the Court also held that it would
have been proper to give the instruction requested but determined that the matter had been
sufficiently covered by other instructions. Id. at 511, 1260. In Macias, the court gave the jury
three instructions on the required state of mind: (1) the elements instruction which discussed
wilfully and unlawfully uses force or violence upon the person of another, actually, intentionally
and unlawfully striking another, or causing bodily harm; (2) wilful instruction which defined a
wilful act as something done on purpose; and (3) the act of union and intent instruction. Id.
When taken together the court decided that the jury had properly been instructed that they could
not find Macias guilty if the acts were committed through misfortune or accident. Id. The Court
went on to further state that it may have even been "preferable" for the court to give the
requested instruction, but it was not essential, therefore not reversible error. Id.
In this there is simply the definition of "malicious." There was no instruction given with
regards to the required intent and therefore the trial court erred when it failed to give the
defendant's requested jury instruction. In this case the evidence was that Ms. Hopkins did not
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intend to put a hole in the wall. In fact she was unaware a hole had even been made until she
was contacted by law enforcement later the same day.
At trial, the State offered the testimony of Deputy Jared Meyer, he offered the following
testimony regarding Ms. Hopkins' intent:
Q. And Kelsey stated to you that she was sorry for her actions at the courthouse?
A.

She did.

Q. And that she had misunderstood the judge's sentence?
A. Yes.
Q. And she also told you at that time that she did not intend to put a hole in the wall?

Q.

So her -- your understanding of her statements was that she did not intend to put a
hole in the wall.

A. Yes.
(4/3/13 Tr. p.135, Ls.16 - p. 137, Ls.4)
Ms. Hopkins also offered testimony at trial and her statements with regard to her intent
were as follow:

Q. And when did you learn of or find out that there had been a hole in the wall?
A. I did not know that there was a hole in the wall until after the officer had come to talk
to me about it.

Q. And that's when you learned that the hole had been put in the wall?
·A. Yes;

Q. And do you know why that is?
A. No.

Q. So, like when you left, you were going quickly?

9

A. Yes.
Q. And so can you just explain to me, you got up and you walked, but then what - how

did you go to out the door, and how did you end up at your car?
A. I'm trying to think. So I went out - I walked quickly outside the door. I turned the

doorknob and went like this, but I did not mean to - for it to hit the wall Q. Okay.
A. - the way it did.
Q. Did you see it right then? Did you see it hit the wall?
A. No, I kept going. I didn't even see it. I didn't hear it hit the wall.

Q. Okay.
A. I just kept going. Like, I was almost like, running, kind of walking, fast pace.
Q. Because you had been upset?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. And so then when the officer had told you that there had been damage, what

did you do?
A. I told him that I was - I apologized for it, and said I would go down there Monday

and talk to them about what I can do, whether I can write a letter to the judge or the
- or the maintenance or whatnot.
Q. So did you intend to put a hole into that wall?
A. No, I did not.

(4/3/13 Tr. p.147, Ls.I -p. 148, Ls.21)

It is of further interest to note that at the sentencing hearing in this case the Court made
-

- -

---------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ -

--~-·--~·-----·-

~~~

the following statement on the record:
Thank you. Well, Miss Hopkins, what I will tell you is that I don't believe that
you purposely put a hole in the wall of the courthouse. You purposely hit the
door and perhaps didn't realize how hard you hit it, but after hearing the evidence
at the trial I don't believe that that was what you intended to come out of it.
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(6/10/13 Sh. p.195, Ls.6-13)
It is clear from the evidence offered at trial and from the statements of the Court that Ms.

Hopkins lacked the specific intent of maliciously and the requested instruction should have been
given to the jury because it properly stated the governing law, a reasonable view of the evidence
would support the defendant's legal theory and more to the point the requested instruction was
not addressed adequately by other jury instructions.

It is undisputed that Ms. Hopkins opened

the door forcefully and that she intended to open the door forcefully. If malicious injury to
property was a general intent crime, that would be enough to convict her. However, the evidence
is clear that there was no intent to commit the wrongful act, which was to cause the damage.
Opening the door in a forceful manner isn't vvrongful, it's not a criminal act. The criminal act is
the damage to the wall and there was no intent by Ms. Hopkins to cause that damage.
ARGUMENT
II.

There Was Insufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That Ms. Hopkins Had
The Requisite Intent To Injure Or Destroy The Property Of Another.
A.

Introduction
Ms. Hopkins asserts that there was insufficient evidence to convict her of malicious

injury to property.

Specifically, that she lacked the requisite intent to maliciously injure or

destroy the property of another. (emphasis added)
B.

Standard of Review
On appeal, it is clear the Court is precluded from substituting its judgment for that of the

jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight of the testimony and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Campbell, 104 Idaho 705, 718-19, 662 P.2d
1149, 1162-63 (Ct.App.1983). The Court must review the evidence, and permissible inferences
11

that can be drawn reasonably from the evidence, in the light most favorable to the respondent.
State v. Slawson, 124 Idaho 753, 757, 864 P.2d 199, 203 (Ct.App.1993).

Where there was

substantial evidence upon which any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered
upon a jury verdict. Id.
C.

There Was Insufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That Ms.
Hopkins Had The Requisite Intent To Maliciously Injure Or Destroy The Property Of
Another.
In this case, there was insufficient evidence to prove that Ms. Hopkins had the intent to

maliciously injure or damage the property of another. Appellate review of the sufficiency of the
evidence is limited in scope. A judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, will not be
overturned on appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact
could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Crawford, 130 Idaho 592, 594, 944 P.2d 727, 729 (Ct.
App. 1997). A reasonable trier of fact could not have found that the prosecution in this case
sustained its burden of proving that Ms. Hopkins maliciously injured or destroyed the property of
another.
An accused's right to demand proof of the State's case beyond a reasonable doubt is of
"surpassing importance." Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000).

The right to

demand proof beyond all reasonable doubt is a bedrock constitutional principle.

See In re

Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)('-'Although virtually unanimous adherence to the reasonable-doubt

standard in common-law jurisdictions may not conclusively establish it is as a requirement of
due process, such adherence does 'reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law
should be enforced and justice administered."' (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155
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(1968)). "Simply stated, the fact that defendant is 'probably' guilty does not equate with guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Ehlert, 811 N.E.2d 620, 631 (Ill. 2004).
In State v. Crawford, 130 Idaho 592,944 P.2d 727 (Ct. App. 1997), it was stated that:
[a]ppellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A
judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, will not be overturned on
appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact
could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt ... [w]e will not substitute our
view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be
given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
evidence ... [m]oreover, we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution.
Id at 594-595, 944 P.2d at 729-730 (citations omitted).

In State v. Mitchell, 130 Idaho 134, 937 P.2d 960 (Ct. App. 1997), it was noted that,
"[ e]vidence is regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it
in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proved." Id. at 135, 937 P.2d at 961.
"The challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is not based on a technical or subtle defect. The
defense simply says that there was not enough admissible evidence to convict the defendant."
State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 877, 908 P.2d 566, 570 (Ct. App. 1995).

The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that the plain language of LC. § 18-7001 does not
imply a legislative intent to create criminal liability under this section where the injury to the
property was an unintended consequence of conduct that may have violated some other statute.
The Court has concluded that by its plain language, LC. § 18-7001 creates culpability for
· malicious injury to property only where the ·defendant's conduct causing the injury is
accompanied by an intent to injure the property of another. State v. Nastoff, 124 Idaho 667, 670,
862 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Ct.App. 1993). Therefore the State is required to prove that Ms. Hopkins
harbored the intent to knowingly injure the real or personal property that she did not own. The
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evidence in this case not only fails to support an inference of malicious intent, but it gives rise to
a contrary inference of accident or misfortune. The Court was even held the belief that there was
no intent to put a hole in the wall of the courthouse. There was no substantial evidence upon
which the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Hopkins intentionally put a
hole in the wall of the courthouse. The State failed to prove the element of malice as required for
conviction under LC.§ 18-7001.
The factual argument's which support this issue has been set forth above in Argument I
and need not be repeated. Ms. Hopkins hereby incorporates them by reference. The State failed
to meet its burden because no evidence was presented at trial that Ms. Hopkins had the requisite
intent to maliciously injure or destroy the property of another. It was clear on all accounts that
Ms. Hopkins intended to forcefully open the door because she was angry and upset at the
sentence that her brother had received. She was upset that he had been remanded and taken into
custody. That intent would be enough if this was a general intent crime. However, malicious
injury to property requires the mental state of committing the illegal act. The illegal act in this
case is not the opening of the door; it is the causing of the damage to the wall which occurred
because the door was opened forcefully. There is not substantial and competent evidence to
support a verdict of guilty with regard to the specific intent required.
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CONCLUSION
Because the proffered evidence yielded facts establishing the defense of misfortune or
accident, it was error for the trial court to refuse giving the requested jury instruction, further
because there was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, Ms. Hopkins respectfully
requests that this court vacate her judgment of conviction and enter a judgment of acquittal.

DATED this 16th day of June 2014.

HEIDI TOLMAN
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this 16th day of June 2014, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document in the above-captioned matter to:

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
PO BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0010
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court.
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